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I'LL TAKE MY SIN TAXES UNWRAPPED AND
MAXIMIZED, WITH A SIDE OF INELASTICITY,
PLEASE*
I. CAN SOMEONE PLEASE EXPLAIN 'WHY" WE ARE PAYING
"THESE" TAXES?
Why tax? Are taxes truly "what we pay for [a] civilized soci-
ety?"' Or, are taxes merely collected "to pay for the responsibili-
ties we have assigned to our [g]overnment?"2 Despite the debate
that might erupt over whether the implementation of responsible
government is synonymous with the promotion of civilized soci-
ety, all entities need money to operate. The government is no dif-
ferent. So, while the initial answer to the opening question is
simple, it only begs the more serious of inquiries; the government
having the power to tax,3 so, what shall be taxed?
To be sure, whatever the choice, it will enrage; as "only [the]
tax laws seem capable of engendering nearly universal anger,
anxiety, paranoia and outright hatred ... ." Americans are ob-
sessed with taxation, focusing obscene amounts of time and in-
tense personal and political debate on the subject.5 Even Holly-
wood joined in the fray with the story of Lucas Doolin, a
Kentucky mountain moonshine runner, who would rather risk
death in a high speed car crash than pay the federal excise tax on
alcohol.6 For all taxpayers, the opening words of Thunder Road
* Special thanks to Professor Mary L. Heen and Dr. Paul D. DePippo for their un-
ending guidance and patience.
This Comment was the first-place winner of the 2001-2002 McNeill Writing Competi-
tion, sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. Compaffa General De Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. 143 CONG. REC. S3228 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
4. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 157 (1996).
5. Id. at 159.
6. See THUNDER ROAD (MGM / United Artists Pictures 1958).
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bring the sensation of tax fear mixed with the pride of law en-
forcement-an odd feeling:
Each year, the millions of gallons of illegal whisky, manufactured in
the Southeastern United States, represents millions of dollars in
taxes lost to the American people. The [tax collectors] and their con-
tinuing service to their country, have, within one year, captured over
10,000 stills and impounded over 3,000 of the powerful vehicles
which are used by the transporters; those wild and reckless men who
transport illegal whisky from its source to its point of distribution.
This is the story of a transporter and his opposite number, an agent
of the U.S. Treasury.7
Enacting a tax forces the government to grapple with many
competing interests, chiefly the economic and the political.' Bur-
ied amongst these considerations lies rationale,9 i.e., the "why"
supporting the choice made. This Comment focuses on the ration-
ale behind the implementation of selective excise taxes;'0 specifi-
cally, the taxation of culturally disfavored products, or more
commonly, "sin taxes." "
Because of its unique history, the taxation of alcohol is argua-
bly the most notorious of all sin taxes. 2 This Comment uses the
taxation of alcohol to demonstrate that, because the most efficient
tax is one that least alters taxpayers' behavior, when the gov-
ernment seeks to implement a selective excise tax it should focus
on products with price-inelastic demands. Such a policy will prove
economically efficient and will provide the government with a
revenue maximizing opportunity. I conclude that the production
of revenue and economic efficiency are the only legitimate justifi-
cations for selective excise taxes. As such, any desired social en-
7. Id. The term "Thunder Road" comes from the echo-like sound made by the gigantic
"mills," large super-charged engines, of the moonshine runners' cars as they barreled
through the mountains of Appalachia. Id. Further, and just as a point of general interest,
many believe that the moonshine runners of the Southeast, like those depicted in Thunder
Road, were the forefathers of modem stock car racing, i.e., NASCAR. See Start Your En-
gines, Thunder Road USA, at http://www.thunderroadusa.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
8. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 162.
9. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1994).
10. An excise tax imposes a duty on the manufacture, sale, and or consumption of a
commodity which in turn forms an indirect tax that falls on the ultimate consumer.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 792 (1993).
11. Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic and Political Inequity of "Sin
Taxes" on Tobacco andAlcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443, 443 (1996).
12. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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gineering and/or equitable considerations should be abandoned
when forming the rationale underlying the institution of an excise
tax. Finally, this leaves the decision of which price-inelastic items
to tax-those that are necessary or those that are not-to be gov-
erned by what is politically acceptable.
Specifically, Part II briefly discusses the history of the taxation
of alcohol. Part III outlines and critiques the modern policy justi-
fications for sin taxes. Part IV presents the argument for the
abandonment of the concept of sin taxes in favor of economic effi-
ciency and revenue maximization. Part V concludes that maxi-
mizing revenue from the selected excise tax of price-inelastic
items is compatible with the tax system's ability-to-pay concerns
and that such taxes should be levied on goods that political de-
bate deems non-essential.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXCISE TAXATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH ALCOHOL
A. Sin Taxes are Luxury Taxes are War Taxes
The sin tax on alcohol is directly related to the American Revo-
lution." The new nation, fresh from victory, owed large sums of
money because of its war debt. Ironically, as excise taxes in Eng-
land likely drove many to the new world and were at the heart of
the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton proposed an excise tax on
whiskey to cover the debt.'4 Hamilton noted that duties on im-
ports were as high as trade permitted and that "'the consumption
of ardent spirits particularly, no doubt very much on account of
their cheapness, is carried on to an extreme, which is truly to be
regretted, as well in regard to the health and the morals, as to the
economy of the community.'"' 5 As such, the birth of the sin tax
came in 1791.6
13. Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical Perspective, in TAXING CHOICE: THE
PREDATORY POLITIcs OF FIscAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 32 (William F. Shughart, II ed.,
1997).
14. Id. at 33.
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Predictably, the sin tax was hated. It even sparked the Whis-
key Rebellion of 1794, in which Pennsylvania farmers, despite
strong words of revolt, were easily quelled by 12,500 militia dis-
patched by President Washington. 7 By the elections of 1800,
similar excise taxes on snuff, sugar, horse drawn carriages, auc-
tion sales, and salt had been imposed.'" The government had
found, with a bit of persuasion, a new and constant source of
revenue-the selective excise tax. By 1807, however, Congress
had repealed all of the excise taxes, just as Thomas Jefferson had
promised in his presidential campaign. 9
During the War of 1812, duties on imports again failed to gen-
erate needed revenue. Consequently, the government again
turned to excise taxes, this time labeling them "war taxes."2" De-
spite being the very same taxes imposed on the public only a dec-
ade earlier, the 1813 excise taxes sparked neither riot nor rebel-
lion, but rather compliance.2' This is because they were sold to
the public as temporary "war taxes," making them much more
palatable.22 Moreover, the country was not just paying down a
debt, but actually using the money contemporaneously to fight a
war. Notwithstanding the success of the "war taxes," they were
repealed in 1817, as promised.23
During the Civil War and World War I, the government also
used excise taxes to raise substantial amounts of revenue for war-
time emergencies. 24 Again, the public accepted this responsibility
without visible rebellion, even when, in 1865, Congress raised the
whiskey tax to $2.00 per gallon, ten times its actual cost." While
most of the excise taxes were repealed after the Civil War, the tax
on liquor remained and became a "permanent fixture of the fed-
eral revenue system."26 Ironically, in 1913, just as the tax on al-
17. Id. at 34.
18. Id. at 34-35.
19. Id. at 35.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36.
24. Id. at 37-38.
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id.
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cohol became the primary source of federal revenue, the modern
income tax system was introduced.
B. Prohibition, the New Deal, and Beyond
The introduction of the modern income tax system ensured
that the excise tax on alcohol, and other commodities, would
never again play the primary role in the federal revenue system.
For example, in 1915, income tax provided only sixteen percent of
federal revenue. 29 By 1918, however, that number had exploded to
seventy-nine percent.0 For the first time, Congress perceived that
it could sustain an intake of revenue, even during wartime, with-
out having to rely on excise taxes to bail out the government.3'
With the prohibitionists' social agenda knocking, sympathetic
congressmen could now safely support the prohibitionist cause
without worrying about re-election.3 2 As such, in 1919, the Eight-
eenth Amendment was passed and the "manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States
and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes [was thereby] prohibited."33
The repeal of Prohibition, just twelve years after it was rati-
fied, was likely the result of many factors. The immediate emer-
gence of a large black market made clear that a sizeable portion
of society did not fully share the values of the temperance move-
ment.34 Further, the government did not have, and was unwilling
to commit, the resources to enforce the ban on such a widespread
scale. 5 Moreover, the advocates of Prohibition were now faced
with the unpleasant thought of choosing between the creation of
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Yelvington, supra note 13, at 40.
28. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 3-4.
29. Id. at 4 n.12.
30. Id.
3L Id. at 5.
32. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). Oddly, the alcohol excise tax remained
good law and collection continued. 'Thus, here [was] an instance in which taxation was
made to apply to something which had no constitutional existence and in which the rights
of property were by law expressly abolished." TUN YUAN-Hu, THE LIQUOR TAX IN THE
UNrIED STATES, 1791-1947, at 57 (1950).
34. Reiter, supra note 11, at 447-48.
35. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 5.
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rampant crime and the continued adherence to an obviously un-
welcome social experiment.36
The Great Depression devastated the American economy and
was the final straw needed to repeal Prohibition. By 1932, income
tax receipts fell to less than half of their 1930 level.37 Despite the
early success of the income tax, the well appeared to be running
dry. Congress needed another source of tax revenue and their old
standby, alcohol, was unavailable.
Like Alexander Hamilton before him, Franklin Delano Roose-
velt realized the revenue generating power of liquor.3 During his
1932 campaign, Roosevelt pledged to repeal Prohibition "'to pro-
vide therefrom a proper and needed revenue."'4 ° Moreover, the
Democrats were quite forthcoming about the government's need
for money from alcohol sales, stating: "'If only given a chance,
Americans might drink themselves into a balanced budget.' 41 In-
deed, after the repeal of Prohibition, alcohol taxes leaped from
two percent of federal revenues in 1933 to thirteen percent in
1936; not the primary source, but a strong contributor.42
The realization that the alcohol sin tax was, again, set to be a
permanent facet of the federal revenue system sparked debate
about its use and long-range goals. Many desired to use the tax
for revenue maximization. Others believed that the tax should
be used primarily as a social control.44 Nearly seventy years later,
despite the fact that the health effects and social costs of alcohol
are widely publicized and well-known, 4 not much has changed.
36. Reiter, supra note 11, at 448-49.
37. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 6.
38. Id.
39. Yelvington, supra note 13, at 40.
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 7.
43. Reiter, supra note 11, at 448.
44. Id. at 449.
45. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991).
In holding that alcohol manufacturers have no duty to warn users of the dangers of the
prolonged consumption of their products, the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
From ancient times, the danger of alcoholism from prolonged and excessive
consumption of alcoholic beverages has been widely known and recognized.
Consequently, we hold that, because the danger of developing the disease of
alcoholism from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages
is and has been generally known and recognized, it is within the ordinary
knowledge common to the community.
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The consumption of alcohol continues to be a way of life for many,
a cultural stigma for others, and taxed heavily, but not fully, for
all.
46
C. History Provides the Wrapping
At its inception, the tax on alcohol was sold to the public as a
pound of flesh that had to be exacted from somewhere. Why not
tax those who partake of spirits, in excess, and care not of their
health and morals? Despite being a sin tax, however, its roots lay
in revenue. Nonetheless, wars and luxuries provided better sales
pitches and opened the door to other excises. Even after its con-
stitutional death, the would-be Valhalla of sin taxes, the alcohol
tax reemerged as a hefty contributor to the pool of federal reve-
nue. Why? Was it revenue? Or was Prohibition so unworkable
that, pragmatically speaking, a tax on an act deemed to be with-
out social value was the only acceptable means of discouraging
that behavior? It seems that, like all political packaging jobs,
these two rationales share a nurturing and symbiotic relation-
ship.
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SIN TAXES
As seen above, when politicians want to raise taxes they need
to find ways to circumvent the inevitable barrage of taxpayer op-
position. Sin taxes make this possible for two reasons. First, they
remove the focus of the tax away from an individual's tax burden
and toward the promotion of some socially virtuous objective, for
example, education. Second, that virtuous objective is achieved in
the name of discouraging some particularly unwelcome social be-
havior, such as drinking alcohol.' Beyond the political sale, how-
ever, modern sin taxes find justifications in economic and pater-
nalistic policies.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. See Reiter, supra note 11, at 450-51.
47. Dwight R. Lee, Overcoming Taxpayer Resistance by Taxing Choice and Earmark-
ing Revenues, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POuTICS OF FIsCAL DISCRIMIINATION
105, 106 (William F. Shughart, II ed., 1997).
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A. Economic Policies
1. User Fees
Many selective excise taxes are enacted on a benefits received
principle.48 The premise is that individual users of a particular
publicly provided benefit consume a larger share of that benefit
and, thus, should bear a greater burden in financing its provi-
sion.49 This burden comes in the form of user fees. The collected
taxes are then, in theory, directly re-allocated to the public ser-
vice. 50 In common parlance, this is known as earmarking. Fur-
ther, by taxing a particular product or activity, the user fees allow
the tax to be avoided by non-users. Thus, the intensity of an indi-
vidual's tax burden is directly linked to his regularity of use.5'
The excise tax on airline tickets provides one example of a user
fee, the monies being earmarked to improve air traffic control fa-
cilities, runways, terminals, and other operational needs.52 Each
passenger provides revenue that is paid into the Airport and Air-
way Trust Fund ("Fund").53 As the Fund matures, specific outlays
should be made for the earmarked purpose. Initially, the airline
industry supported the creation of the Fund, as it afforded the
opportunity to pool resources for expenditures and improve ser-
vice for the collective benefit of their "taxpayers," the users."
Practical reality, as it often does, disrupted this plan.
Revenue collected from user fees, like any other collected tax
monies, requires Congress to act before funds are allocated. In-
tended beneficiaries of user fees, even the air-traveling public, are
a minority of the population in a majority-rule system. In this
case, receipts and outlays from the Fund are budget items that
48. William F. Shughart, II, The Economics of the Nanny State, in TAXING CHOICE:





52. See Randall G. Holcombe, Selective Excise Taxation from an Interest-Group Per-
spective, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 81, 87
(William F. Shughart, II ed., 1997).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 88.
55. Id.
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have federal budget deficit implications. 6 Thus, Fund spending
generates "red ink" spending which is "politically unpopular."
57
Despite extensive lobbying by the airline industry, the Fund re-
mains relatively unspent, instead being used to reduce the budget
deficit."8
User fees do not provide a sound rationale for the alcohol sin
tax. The user fees concept is a benefits-based theory, and there is
no such publicly provided good or service specifically and directly
related to the consumption of alcohol. One possible exception,
however, might be the funding of liquor licensing authorities and
state operated liquor stores.59 This provides weak support, how-
ever, because a fundamental difference exists between state-
provided benefits, such as roads, and state regulation of a par-
ticular industry. The latter monitors and perhaps curtails an ac-
tivity while the former makes an activity possible. Further, once
revenue is collected it would be nearly politically impossible to al-
locate funds designated to specifically benefit drinkers or the al-
cohol industry.
2. Corrective Taxes/Social Costs
Corrective taxes are instituted when society suffers market
failure.6" Market failure occurs when "freely functioning private
market institutions 'fail to sustain "desirable" activities or to es-
top "undesirable" activities.'' This situation arises when activi-
ties do not bear their full social costs, or cannot seize their full so-
cial benefits.62 This phenomenon applies to sin taxes because of
the problem of negative externality; that is, social costs in excess
of private costs. 63
The social costs of the consumption of alcohol are perceived in
all shapes, sizes, and volumes. For example, in order to combat
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 88-89.
59. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Puzzling Case of the Revenue-Maximizing Lottery, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2000).
60. Shughart, supra note 48, at 20.
61. Id. (quoting Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351,
351 (1958)).
62. Id. at 20-21.
63. Id. at 21.
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the "'increasing tide of drunkenness.. . "tending to the destruc-
tion of the health of the people, enervating them, and rendering
them unfit for useful labor and service"... [corrupting their]
morals, driv[ing them] into all manner of vices and wickedness,'"
the English Parliament, in 1727, passed the Act Against Geneva
providing for a steep excise tax on the consumption of gin.64 This
"increasing tide" also exists in America: it is currently estimated
that seventy-six million adults have been exposed to alcoholism in
the family home.65 And, researchers believe that alcoholism "re-
tards educational attainment by more than a full grade, with cor-
responding decreases in earning potential."" Further, alcohol di-
rectly drains the resources and operating capabilities of already
overburdened entities such as public hospitals, police forces,
courts, prisons, and the welfare system.67 For example, public
hospitals dealing with health care problems directly related to the
consumption of alcohol may be undercompensated by nearly $1
billion per year for the treatment of those problems.6" Lastly, it is
unlikely that these social costs will subside as the number of al-
coholics continues to rise, as does the amount society spends on
alcohol.69
Proponents of corrective sin taxes argue that the consumption
of alcohol imposes the above discussed costs on society that con-
sumers themselves do not directly bear, and consequently, do not
consider when making the decision to drink.71 Consumers, there-
fore, will drink "more than is optimal from society's point of
view."7 ' The government, through sin taxes, can force consumers
to internalize the negative externalities of these actions.72 This is
64. Adam Gifford, Jr., Whiskey, Margarine, and Newspapers: A Tale of Three Taxes, in
TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 57, 60 (William F.
Shughart, II ed., 1997) (quoting 4 STEPHEN DOWELL, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND TAXES
IN ENGLAND 167 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 1965) (1884)).
65. Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures
for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 100 (1994).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 90.
68. Id. at 101.
69. See id. at 100. For example, there were 750,000 reported alcoholics in 1940. That
number rose to over six million by 1980. As of 1994, the country was spending in excess of
$92 billion on alcohol products. Id.
70. Shughart, supra note 48, at 21.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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because when an excise tax is levied, its burden is passed on to
the ultimate consumer, at an increased price. Those favoring sin
taxes believe that being forced to pay more for a bottle of liquor
will cause an individual to buy less, and, in turn, drink less.73
Thus, less drinking on a societal scale will decrease the overall
social costs and correct the failed market. Further, similar to use
taxes, the revenue generated can be earmarked and used to com-
pensate those entities facing the brunt of the remaining external
costs.'
The major critique of corrective taxation is its distortion of the
concept of externalization.75 Simply, critics argue that advocates
of corrective taxation greatly exaggerate social costs in compari-
son to those that remain private. 6 For example, if an individual
misses work due to alcohol consumption, society pays for his lack
of production. While this might be true on a daily, case-by-case
basis, over time, frequently absent workers produce less and,
thus, get paid less and are most likely overlooked for promo-
tions.7 On a societal scale, then, the allocation of resources over
time internalizes the costs without taxation.78
Further, current data dealing with medical costs used by cor-
rective tax advocates does not sufficiently support a finding of
causation. 9 Aside from property damage and third party personal
injury, there has been no demonstration that alcohol-related
medical costs exist in addition to regular medical costs." Specifi-
cally, the advocates' premise rests on the unproved assertion that
"drinkers and nondrinkers have identical medical costs for every-
thing unrelated to alcohol."8 '
73. Id.
74. Id. In 1993, the Clinton Administration attempted this very scheme by trying to
raise the federal excise tax on cigarettes as "a fair way to support health care." Yelvington,
supra note 13, at 52 (internal citations omitted).
75. See Richard E. Wagner, The Taxation of Alcohol and the Control of Social Costs, in
TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIINATION 227, 232 (William
F. Shughart, 11 ed., 1997).
76. See Shughart, supra note 48, at 21.
77. See id. at 22-23.
78. See id. at 22.
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When insurance is involved, as it usually is, it is incorrect to
say that those filing claims are imposing costs on those not fil-
ing. 2 At first, this may seem erroneous from an ex post point of
view; that is, the claimants are being subsidized by the non-
claimants and generating more pay-outs and, thus, there is a
greater potential for a hike in premiums.83 However, people buy
insurance knowing that accidents happen, houses burn down, and
people get ill. That is why they participate in the first place.
Viewed ex ante, participants bargain for this benefit.' Lastly,
without data that drinkers, in fact, use insurance more often and
for alcohol-related claims, it is incorrect to say that such costs are
societal.85
B. Paternalistic Policies
Paternalism is the care of an underling, a subordinate, by a
knowing and compassionate father.86 While this may be a bit
flowery for a sin tax, the rationale is the same-the protection of
a person's welfare, values, and interests, as perceived by the gov-
ernment to be "good" or "beneficial" to that person's life." This
line of thinking is aptly described by Ronald Dworkin: "[I]n a
genuine political community each citizen has a responsibility for
the well-being of other members and should therefore use his po-
litical power to reform those whose defective practices will ruin
their lives." 8 Further, because paternalistic taxes focus on the
benefit to the person, any revenue gained is purely incidental. 9
Taken to its logical conclusion, a paternalistic tax is temporary
and self-destructive, in that like medicine, it only seeks to curb
and eventually terminate the undesired behavior. In theory, once
the problem is taken care of, the tax will be repealed.90
82. Id. at 239.
83. Id. at 239-40.
84. Id. at 240.
85. See id. at 239-40.
86. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1654 (1993).
87. Reiter, supra note 11, at 451.
88. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, in MORALITY, HARM, AND THE LAW 36, 36
(Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994).
89. Reiter, supra note 11, at 451-52.
90. See id. at 452.
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While the potential effects of the excessive or long-term con-
sumption of alcohol are well known and will not be repeated
here,9 paternalistic taxes suffer heavy criticism due to their sub-
jectivity-that is, "one's own good" is not defined by the individ-
ual's sense of his own personal welfare, but what is deemed to be
beneficial for him by his community.92 Some find it odd that a so-
ciety dedicated to social compassion and individual dignity re-
verses field on selected subjects, thereby giving relatively little
weight to individual perceptions of the quality and goals of one's
life, instead employing coercive methods to change behavior.
Related to the promotion of an individual's well-being is soci-
ety's interest in the advancement and observance of cultural val-
ues.94 The paternalistic tax can be used to enforce behaviors
which will benefit society as a whole. For example, the teetotalers
of the temperance movement argued that the discouragement of
idle and unproductive activities such as drinking would eventu-
ally lead to greater social welfare.95 Such majoritarian tactics,
however, seem to be in direct conflict with America's ideal of pro-
tecting and securing individual rights and liberties.
Beyond the possible sacrifice of individual freedoms, paternal-
istic taxes looking to promote the societal good may also take on
class biases.96 Evidence of this originated in the early temperance
proponents' desire to provide a "moral uplift" for the lower
classes, prone to indulge in drinking.97 One need only look to the
"vices" chosen for taxation-smoking and drinking-to see that
these activities pervade the daily lives of the lower classes.9" Ac-
tivities traditionally engaged in by the middle and upper classes,
such as skiing, are nary the subject of a sin tax, yet they are ar-
guably just as physically dangerous and socially unproductive.9
Finally, paternalistic taxes, like all taxes, threaten individual
choice, and they do so in an internally contradictory manner. °0
91. See, e.g., Gangarosa et al., supra note 65, at 86.
92. See Reiter, supra note 11, at 452.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 453.
95. See id.




100. Id. at 456.
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Choice and the exercise of free will are cornerstones of our democ-
ratic government, yet paternalistic policies transform these cor-
nerstones into "good receptacle [s]."'O' They are good receptacles in
that "'interference with that process of choice produces dissatis-
faction because adjudging individuals incapable of making their
own decisions implies a lack of respect for their worth as human
beings."'10 2 While attempting to create a "better" society, paternal-
istic taxes work to erode the desired values of community respect
and societal integrity.
IV. ABANDONING THE SIN TAx AND MOVING TOWARD NECESSITY
Regardless of the rationale or justification, taxation is funda-
mentally unfair to taxpayers. "Each dollar the Government col-
lects is a dollar someone else has earned." °3 Similarly, the un-
fairness to taxpayers rings in the economic burden imposed by a
particular tax.0 4 Taxation is also economically inefficient; taxes
force the allocation of economic resources away from their most
productive uses.0 5 Because of these truths, modern tax theory
has adopted three ideals to which legislators should aspire when
enacting or reforming a tax.' These ideals are equity, efficiency,
and simplicity.' ° Within the confines of these ideals, I argue that
the sin tax rationale for the alcohol excise tax should be rejected
and abandoned. When the government seeks to exercise its power
to enact selective excise taxes, the production of revenue and eco-
nomic efficiency are the only legitimate justifications. These goals
will best be promoted by taxing only price-inelastic and unneces-
sary goods.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 457 (quoting Steven Kelman, Regulation and Paternalism, in RIGHTS AND
REGULATION: ETHICAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 217, 220 (Tibor R. Machan & M.
Bruce Johnson eds., 1983)).
103. 143 CONG. REC. S3228 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
104. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 162.
105. See, e.g., 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 13 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]. In this connection the words of
Justice Holmes should be kept in mind: "[E]very exaction of money for an act is a discour-
agement to the extent of the payment required." Compaia General De Tabacos de Filipi-
nas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. See TREASURY I, supra note 105, at 13-16.
107. Id. As the concept of simplicity is not particularly germane to my proposal, I will
save its discussion for another day.
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A. Economic Efficiency
1. Neutrality
In a free market economy without any taxation, assuming
competition, resources tend to be put to their most productive
uses.' Therefore, it is assumed that the price of a bottle of liquor
is equal to its marginal cost.'0 9 That price will be where the mar-
ket has reached equilibrium." 0 When an excise tax is introduced,
however, the supplier of the product is forced to raise the price,
which in turn will cause consumers to buy less."' The higher
price, in terms of real dollars, persuades consumers not to buy, or
to switch to other products (e.g., beer) that seem cheaper, despite
being either inferior to our bottle of liquor or perhaps more costly
to produce." 2
Aside from shifting consumers to and from different products,
the effect of this tax "wedge" between the price of the bottle of
liquor and the money taken in by the supplier also produces what
is known as a "deadweight" loss or excess burden."' It is called
deadweight because the losses to the market participants are
greater than the revenue collected by the government." 4 The
deadweight is, however, not to be confused with the actual tax
revenue. Rather, these losses represent some purchases, benefit-
ing both buyers and sellers, that are not made because the tax
has been levied." 5 Alternatively, it is the value of the goods not
produced and consumed because of the tax-the burden the tax
imposes on society-which is transferred away from the market
participants and lost forever, not being transferred to anyone."
6
While this may seem insignificant in the context of a bottle of liq-
uor, a recent study estimates the excess burden of the entire fed-
eral tax system to be between thirteen and twenty-four cents for
108. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 482 (4th ed. 1992).
109. Id.
110. PAULA. SAMUELSON & WILLLAi D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 52 (15th ed. 1995).
111. POSNER, supra note 108, at 482.
112. Id.
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every tax dollar collected, or nearly five percent of the United
States's Gross National Product.117
At the heart of an economically efficient tax is the concept of
neutrality. Neutrality demands that an ideal tax system disrupt
these marketplace decisions as little as possible."' As such, with-
out more, the imposition of selective excise taxes violates this
concept in the most egregious of manners.
2. Elasticity
The "something more" suggested above is the consideration of
the price elasticity of demand (or price elasticity)." 9 Price elastic-
ity "measures how much the quantity demanded of a good
changes when its price changes. " "' More precisely, it is the per-
centage change in quantity demanded over the percentage change
in price.'2 ' While the price elasticities of different goods vary
enormously, goods are generally placed into two categories-
price-elastic or price-inelastic demand.
122
Goods are considered to have a price-elastic demand if a one
percent change in price generates more than a one percent
change in the quantity demanded. 23 Conversely, if a one percent
change in price precipitates less than a one percent change in the
quantity demanded, the goods are considered to have a price-
inelastic demand.
124
As will be discussed in more detail below, price elasticity is
closely related to individual necessity. 25 Items like food, fuel for
the home and car, and clothing cannot easily be gone without
and, thus, tend to be more price-inelastic. The closer an item
comes to being a luxury or having a ready substitute, such as va-
cations and designer clothing, the more likely those items will be
117. Id. at 17 (citing RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 173 (1988)).
118. TREASURY I, supra note 105, at 13.
119. POSNER, supra note 108, at 482-83.
120. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 110, at 58.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 59.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 58.
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price-elastic. 126 Price elasticity is also time sensitive. That is, the
longer a person has to adjust his or her behavior, the more price-
elastic items that he consumes will become. 127 Gasoline provides a
good example. A substantial hike in gas prices will be unlikely to
alter a person's desire to purchase gasoline while driving on a
cross-country vacation. Will the person sell his car to walk the
rest of the way? Unlikely.12 Over time, however, that same per-
son might adjust his behavior, opting to utilize mass transit in
lieu of driving, or perhaps buying a more fuel-efficient car,
thereby reducing his demand for gasoline. 29
3. The Relationship Between Selective Excise Taxes and Price
Elasticity
British economist and mathematician Frank Ramsey expressed
the relationship between selective excise taxes and price elastic-
ity in 1927.13° Ramsey's rule states that "in order to minimize the
excess burden ... taxes should be placed on goods in inverse pro-
portion to their elasticities of demand."' 3 ' Given the goal of eco-
nomic efficiency through neutral tax policies, the rationale is that
the less people care about changes in a commodity's price, from
whatever the source, the smaller the reduction in their purchases
of the commodity when its price rises, i.e., the quantity demanded
falls less. 2
Ramsey's rule justifies an excise tax on alcohol. 3 3 Just as Alex-
ander Hamilton noted over 200 years ago, despite alcohol not be-
ing a staff of life, consumption "is carried on to an extreme."
1 34
That the alcohol tax carried the federal tax system on its back un-
til the institution of the modern income tax is a testament to the
price-inelasticity of demand for alcohol. No matter what the tax





130. Shughart, supra note 48, at 17.
13L Id.
132. See SAMIUELSON & NORDHAuS, supra note 110, at 311.
133. Shughart, supra note 48, at 17-18.
134. Yelvingston, supra note 13, at 33.
135. See Reiter, supra note 11, at 446; Shughart, supra note 48, at 17 (noting that con-
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tory reveals, fashion may come and go, but there has never been
an effective substitute, in terms of satisfaction, to the drinking of
wines and spirits ... .'136
4. Economic Efficiency Versus Discouragement: An Inherent
Contradiction
Opponents argue, and I agree, that the use of Ramsey's rule for
the justification of sin taxes fails as a matter of logic. This is be-
cause, as defined by both the corrective tax and paternalistic ra-
tionales, the primary goal of a sin tax is to discourage a particular
behavior, in our case the consumption of alcohol.3 Therefore,
proponents attempting to sell a sin tax on alcohol will invariably
find themselves in the precarious situation of arguing against
themselves; first expounding upon the need to discourage the dis-
ruptive and unwanted behavior, but then not too much, as the tax
must raise needed revenue. 3 ' Because Ramsey's rule dictates
that the impact of taxation on the quantity demanded of com-
modities with price-inelastic demands is substantially lessened, if
not minimal, the teetotaler's original objective of discouragement
will most likely fail."9 Thus, the rationale and ultimate policy
goals of Ramsey's rule directly conflict with those of a sin tax.
To remedy this conflict, I propose divorcing the two and aban-
doning the sin tax rationale. This will leave the excise tax on al-
cohol in place, justified by Ramsey's rule. It will also remove the
goal of any direct and desired social engineering. When the at-
tempt to control individuals' actions through taxation is aban-
doned, the only legitimate justification for taxation is the produc-
tion of revenue. Thus, considering economic efficiency, the
government, if it does tax commodities, must focus on those with
price-inelastic demands. This promotes the production of revenue
sumers are unresponsive to increases in the price of alcohol). An economic survey provid-
ing price elasticity estimates for a number of goods gives a price elasticity for alcohol of
0.92 which, given the formula discussed above, is price-inelastic. See RALPH T. BYRNS &
GERALD W. STONE, ECONOMICS 456 (6th ed. 1995).
136. Paula A. Gant & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Excise Taxes, Social Costs, and the Con-
sumption of Wine, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL
DISCRIMINATION 247, 247 (William F. Shughart, II ed., 1997).
137. Shughart, supra note 48, at 18.
138. Id.
139. See id.
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because when the price of a price-inelastic good is increased, so is
the amount of tax revenue collected.14° Further, because the tax is
economically more efficient, it will create a smaller amount of ex-
cess burden. 4
As discussed above, the desire of corrective tax proponents, and
to some extent user fee proponents, to use a sin tax to recoup the
societal costs imposed by consumption may be compelling when
viewed from the standpoint of social responsibility-that is the
drinkers' need to internalize the negative externalities of their
drinking, but fails even the most basic form of efficiency analysis.
The attempt to coerce the non-consumption of alcohol through
taxation is, by definition and design, not revenue neutral; in-
stead, it "distort[s] choices about how income is ... spent,""'
thereby forcing economic resources away from their most produc-
tive uses. This is not efficient. Paternalistic rationales fail for the
same reasons.
5. Revenue Maximizing
All goods with price-inelastic demands provide the government
with a revenue maximizing opportunity. A recent study shows,
however, that the taxation of alcohol, including both federal and
state taxes, is well below the revenue maximizing level.1 43 Thus,
governments clearly have room to adjust and experiment with
their taxes to fully exploit the tax potential of alcohol.144
Governments estimate the amount of tax dollars they expect to
collect from any particular tax when setting the rates.1 45 They do
this with, we hope, some eye toward the amount of revenue they
will need to operate successfully. The ability to maximize revenue
from a tax that inflicts the minimum amount of excess burden
will, in turn, allow the government to reduce, or possibly elimi-
140. Id.
141. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 110, at 62.
142. TREASURY I, supra note 105, at 13.
143. Zelenak, supra note 59, at 8. It must be noted, however, that the revenue maxi-
mizing tax level will also depend on the price elasticity of supply. Specifically, unless the
price elasticity of supply is infinite, it is unlikely that tax revenue will be maximized at the
point which the price elasticity of demand of a good reaches 1.0.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§
621-61 (2000).
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nate, taxes from areas where economic neutrality is more difficult
to achieve.
Despite this fact, forty-nine states and the federal government
do not maximize their potential profits from the sale of alcohol.'46
In the 1990s, it was estimated that Congress could raise an addi-
tional $23.5 billion dollars over five years by increasing the fed-
eral excise tax on alcohol (distilled spirits) from $13.50' to
$16.00 per gallon.'48 Nevertheless, despite balanced budget con-
cerns, Congress did not take this action. Similarly, most states
that control the sale of one or more types of alcohol do not exploit
their monopoly to maximize revenue. 49 Instead, they operate to
"'reasonably satisfy the public demand and protect the public in-
terest 1"' Only New Hampshire directs its liquor commission to
operate state stores to maximize revenue.' Given the analysis
above, these governments should reconsider their fiscal policy
concerning the taxation of alcohol.
B. The Inapplicability of Equity Considerations in Excise
Taxation
Fairness in taxation is a widely accepted ideal that manifests
itself in horizontal equity, the non-discriminatory treatment of
.sinilarly situated taxpayers, and vertical equity, the considera-
don of taxpayers' ability to pay. 5'
Horizontal equity is based on the theory that, if two taxpayers
have similar incomes, their tax burdens should also be relatively
similar. ' Excise taxes do not create any real horizontal equity
probiems because the tax is a per unit tax, wholly independent of
the tax status of the purchaser. By definition, when any two con-
suners in groups with similar incomes purchase items subject to
an excise tax, they are treated equally.
1, Zelenak, supra note 59, at 10.
f. ., .5001(a) 1) (2000).
,,1 Aq, s'tora note 59, at 9.
T! ,'TAH CODE ANN. § 32A-7-704(3) (1999)).
N H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177:3(II) (1994)). The New Hampshire statute
.: ( w' h "primary duties" of the liquor commission is to "optimize the profit-
Sconmmisslo.' N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176:(3)(I) (1994).
'l . i vl supra note 105, at 14-15.
If.: [
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Vertical equity, however, is more difficult because it is rooted
in the notion that "households [or taxpayers in groups] with in-
comes below the poverty level should pay little or no tax."'54 Fur-
ther, after poorer taxpayers attempt to provide themselves with
the basic necessities of life, they do not have any real tax-paying
ability.'55 In short, to ensure that the ability-to-pay notion re-
mains intact, the goal of the concept of vertical equity is to main-
tain inequality in taxing.
Many argue that, because excise taxes are exacted on a per
unit basis, they are regressive.'56 That is, the tax imposed ac-
counts for a larger percentage of a poorer taxpayer's income than
it does for a wealthier taxpayer, which violates the concept of ver-
tical equity.'57 With the realm of excise taxation, I disagree.
There are two arguments presented below that negate the use
of a vertical equity analysis in the context of excise taxation, as
posited in this Comment. Both arguments turn on the concept of
choice, both in its subjective and objective forms. First, the excise
taxation of commodities that society, through its political proc-
esses, deems unnecessary, do not warrant equitable concerns,
namely regressivity concerns. This is because the taxpayers' sub-
jective choice in purchasing unnecessary goods, that is, he does
not need them to survive, ameliorates the ability-to-pay and allo-
cation of the burden concerns prevalent in our tax system. Sec-
ond, the excise taxation of commodities as opposed to, say, income
grants individuals an objective choice as to how they will be
taxed. This objective choice renders all taxpayers equal as well as
inherently enhancing their individual welfare by being given the
choice.
1. Importance of the Effect on the Individual
At the heart of any regressivity argument lies the assumption
that the value of dollars to an individual decreases as he amasses
more money.5 5 If this assumption about the importance of money
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id.
156. Reiter, supra note 11, at 461.
157. Id. at 461-62.
158. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1947 (1987).
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was not made, the concept of vertical equity would have no teeth.
For instance, if a purchaser of a bottle of liquor was unconcerned
about the utility and value of his dollars, no matter how many he
had, it could hardly be inequitable to have him spend a larger
percentage of it on excise taxes than did the next person. The lar-
ger point to be gained from this example is not that people do not
care about the utility of their money. Surely they do. Rather, the
larger point is the personalization of the fairness argument. This
is the precise point where vertical equity fails when used to
evaluate excise taxation.
This focus on the individual is supported by scholarship advo-
cating the use of welfare economics' and optimal taxation6 ° in
the evaluation of legal and tax policy, which are firmly based on
the idea of individual welfare or well-being.'6 ' While the goal of
these theories is to maximize the welfare of society,6 2 it is their
means of measuring individuals' welfare that are persuasive for
us. 3 Individual welfare depends primarily on the amount of con-
sumption and leisure a person enjoys.6 4 Consumption and leisure
are then, of course, traded off against work as individuals find
their optimal utility.6 5
The notion of well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive
in nature. It incorporates in a positive way everything that an indi-
vidual might value-goods and services that the individual can con-
sume, social and environmental amenities, personally held notions of
fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth. Similarly,
an individual's well-being reflects in a negative way harms to his or
her person and property, costs and inconveniences, and anything else
the individual might find distasteful .... The only limit on what is
included in well-being is to be found in the minds of individuals
themselves, not in the minds of analysts.
166
This concept of individual well-being, its proponents argue,
should replace and subsequently exclude current notions of fair-
159. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961
(2001).
160. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 158, at 1946-65 (explaining and analyzing
James Mirrlees' original 1971 theory of the optimal taxation of income).
161. Id. at 1946; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 159, at 979-89.
162. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 158, at 1946.
163. See id. at 1950-54.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1947.
166. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 159, at 980.
I'LL TAKE MY SIN TAXES UNWRAPPED
ness.167 Notions of fairness serve as "rules of thumb or proxy prin-
ciples," thought to aid in the evaluation of policy to promote social
fairness without regard to the actual effect on individual well-
being.168 The concepts of vertical equity and regressivity are ex-
amples of these notions.
While the policy goals of optimal taxation and welfare econom-
ics, and the mechanisms employed to obtain those goals, are quite
different from those which I advocate here, in the context of pol-
icy evaluation they shift the focus on how the effect of a tax
should be measured. That is, an excise tax should be measured by
its effect on the individual, rather than as a tool of comparison
holding classes of individuals (grouped by income) next to each
other to achieve relative equity (i.e., vertical equity).
It is important to note that while the theories of welfare eco-
nomics and optimal taxation rest on the concept of individual wel-
fare, their ultimate goal is to use findings on individual welfare to
assist in making policy decisions that increase the welfare of soci-
ety.'69 Using the amorphous definitions of individual welfare pro-
vided by these theories, I find that the concepts of social and indi-
vidual welfare are not interchangeable nor compatible in the
context of excise taxation. An individual's thoughts on the proper
disposal of his resources, and his choice whether to act on those
thoughts, are virtually unknowable and nearly immeasurable.
Individuals are therefore much less capable of being grouped with
others considered to be equals for the purposes of excise taxation.
This is because the importance individuals place on their time
and resources, combined with their ever-fluctuating consumer de-
sires, changes daily, if not more rapidly. Thus, the basic concept
of choice aggravates the concept of social welfare with respect to
excise taxation, as well as the pigeon-holing done for the sake of
vertical equity.
2. Affecting Choice and Optional Taxation
When evaluating an excise tax, then, analysts should ask: does
the tax unreasonably overburden an individual's ability to affect
167. Id. at 1011.
168. See id. at 1004.
169. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 158, at 1950-54.
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his own welfare or well-being? Or, alternatively, does the tax in-
tolerably inhibit a person from exercising rational choice to
maximize his own well-being? For an excise tax, the answer is
most surely no. This flows from the concept of choice, which per-
vades both the operation of our market places and our societal
fabric.17 ° It is axiomatic that all of these activities necessarily in-
volve choice. Further, it is important to understand that this ar-
gument embraces the concept of "pure" choice; it makes no differ-
entiation between a diabetic's choice in deciding whether to buy
insulin or a bottle of liquor. It purposely avoids the concept of ne-
cessity and makes no assumptions or value judgments between
commodities or the demands individuals tend to place on them.
Inside the realm of taxation, choice plays a key role. Aside from
emigration, death, and tax evasion, no taxpayer, assuming he has
employment, has a choice as to whether he should pay income
tax.' 7 In this sense, the income tax is similar to a head tax, or
poll tax.77 An excise tax, however, presents a very different situa-
tion for the taxpayer. As noted above, this tax does not inhibit an
individual from weighing all the factors surrounding his personal
welfare before choosing whether to be taxed. Should the taxpayer
feel that an excise tax consumes too large a portion of his income,
thus increasing the opportunity cost of the purchase and upset-
ting his currently desired balance of consumption, leisure, and
work, he can choose not to consume. This tradeoff is easily seen
when a taxpayer buys a bottle of liquor. The purchase and subse-
quent drinking represent the taxpayer's belief that the money
(including the excise tax) is best spent on that particular item
170. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (noting, as a matter of public interest, the importance of the free flow
of commercial information and that, "in the aggregate," consumers' numerous commercial
choices should "be intelligent and well informed"); Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564
(1972). In Roth, the Supreme Court expressed "liberty," under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as:
"not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men."... In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of"liberty" must be broad indeed.
Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
171. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
172. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 110, at 312.
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and that his time spent in lieu of work, and therefore without
compensation, is more valuable to him in this activity. As such,
being taxed is optional. Weighing of factors is, for the most part,
unavailable when considering whether to pay income tax. 3
3. Final Questions for Policy Makers
Despite the conclusion above, there is a very real relationship
between necessity and choice. I assume that a taxpayer has an
income to purchase items necessary to survive such as food, wa-
ter, shelter, and clothing. While these are plainly choices, they
are, for most, "choiceless" necessity. It is, however, extremely
probable that all would agree that alcohol is the type of product
that is not necessary or essential to sustain life. Therefore, a tax
on alcohol does not hold an individual hostage to a higher price on
an item he must have to survive. No real element of compulsion
exists." 4
For other excise taxes, this leaves two tough and intertwined
questions for policy makers. First, the idea of maximizing taxes
on "necessary and essential" items is not compatible with the
ability-to-pay notions that permeate our current tax system. So,
what should be considered "necessary?" Quite obviously this cate-
gory extends well beyond the "bare essentials." Second, given this
political and social reality, where should the lines be drawn?
What choices on consumption, if any, does the government want
to force upon taxpayers? Although the answer to the second ques-
tion largely depends on the first, I will not attempt to draft guide-
lines to generate answers for these questions, as what is accepted
as necessary will differ greatly from community to community
and from person to person. These are purely political questions;
as the winds of necessity change, so do the answers.
173. This, of course, assumes that the majority of people would rather pay their taxes
than face criminal punishment. It also ignores people who, for example, would choose to
not work extra hours because after taxes they feel that their monetary gain is not as im-
portant as the required time commitment.
174. There are arguments about the addictive qualities of alcohol and their relation-
ship to necessity that might be discussed here, but they are outside the scope of this Com-
ment.
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V. FINAL THOUGHTS
At the beginning of this Comment, I raised many broad and
sweeping questions and briefly discussed them. These questions
dealt with some of the basic underlying feelings with which
nearly all taxpayers grapple. For example, why are we being
taxed at this rate and in this particular manner? Whether the ra-
tionale behind the tax is merely being touted to generate political
and social acceptance or is firmly grounded in efficiency and eq-
uity analysis, the effect on the taxpayer is the same; we pay the
tax. Because it is (was) commonplace to refer to the tax on alcohol
as a sin tax, it is important to level any preconceived notions
about the validity of even questioning such a tax. These notions
tend to reflect the belief that alcohol should be taxed through the
roof because it is, well, alcohol.
Given this, it has been demonstrated that whether a particular
product is "good" or "bad" is particularly inconsequential when
deciding if and how to tax that item. Here, the traditional tax
concepts of efficiency and equity provide solid answers to scholars
and lay persons who may question the maximization of the taxa-
tion of alcohol or confuse its maximization with other proposed
rationales such as paternalism or the corrective tax. The remain-
ing question is, does that really matter?
As is evidenced throughout this Comment, the taxation of alco-
hol has been given many different names and has supporters of
its many different rationales. These rationales have come in and
out of fashion over the history of the nation, yet the tax itself, not
even excluding the years of prohibition, has remained. One has to
question then: what is the real rationale for the tax on alcohol?
The history and endurance of the tax leaves us with only one sen-
sible answer-to raise revenue. If this is the "real" answer, and
given that alcohol has a price-inelastic demand and is thought by
many to be "unnecessary," then maximization is a most logical
next step.
David J. DePippo
